Abstract: This paper provides an empirical assessment of the relation between the cyclicality of fiscal expenditure policy, output volatility, and economic growth, using a cross-section of 88 countries over the period 1960 to 2004. Identification of the effects of (endogenous) cyclical expenditure policy is achieved by exploiting the exogeneity of countries" political and institutional characteristics, which we find to be relevant determinants of the cyclicality of expenditures. There are three main results: First, both pro-and countercyclical expenditure policy amplify output volatility, much in a way like pure fiscal shocks. Second, output volatility, due to variations in cyclical and discretionary fiscal policy, is negatively associated with economic growth. Third, there is no direct effect of cyclicality on economic growth other than through output volatility.
I. Introduction
Does fiscal policy affect economic growth? This is clearly one of the most fundamental and policy relevant macroeconomic questions. According to Easterly (2005) there is no robust evidence for a relation between macroeconomic policies (including fiscal policy) and economic growth, once institutions are controlled for. In contrast, Caballero (2008, p. 1) argues that "Good macroeconomic policy helps growth ... I do not think this view is in any dispute in the applied and policy world."
Notwithstanding the wide agreement that macroeconomic policies can influence economic performance, it remains a challenge for both theory and empirics to identify the channels through which economic policy affects growth. The emergence of new endogenous growth theory, overcoming the traditional dichotomy between business cycle and growth theory, has laid the ground for such an analysis. It is hardly questioned that economic policy affects economic activity in the short run. If business cycle volatility and economic growth are related as suggested by endogenous growth theory, economic policy can indirectly affect growth through its effect on volatility. Such a finding would also lead to a reassessment of macroeconomic priorities: The welfare cost of volatility per se are widely regarded as negligible since Lucas (1987) . But if volatility turns out to have a negative effect on economic growth, its costs -or equivalently, the gains from stabilization -will be substantial (Barlevy, 2004) .
Regarding the role of fiscal policy, Fatas and Mihov (2003) suggest introducing fiscal rules as a means to reduce the use of discretionary fiscal policy, defined as fiscal policy unrelated to the business cycle, based on their finding for a large cross-section of 91 countries that aggressive use of discretionary policy lowers growth by increasing output volatility. This paper highlights the role of another important element of fiscal policy, namely cyclical fiscal policy. So far, there are hardly studies investigating the effects of fiscal cyclicality on economic growth. One notable exception is Aghion and Marinescu (2007) , who consider an (unbalanced) panel of annual data for 19 OECD countries from 1960 to 2007. Regressing growth on alternative cyclicality measures (and standard controls for economic growth regressions), they find a positive effect of the "countercyclicality" of fiscal policy on economic growth.
The main goal of the present paper is to shed more light on the role of cyclical fiscal policy and its transmission channels, considering both its effect on output volatility, and -in a second step -its effect on economic growth. Other than previous studies we consider a large cross-section of 88 countries covering the period 1960 to 2004, which is motivated by the use of (de facto) time-invariant variables on the countries" political and institutional characteristics to identify the causal effect of (endogenous) cyclicality on output volatility. The use of institutional variables as instruments for fiscal policy was first suggested by Fatas (2003) . The present study extends their analysis in considering the role of cyclical fiscal policy (as well as that of discretionary fiscal policy). We demonstrate that institutional variables (such as political of constraints and the average number of elections) provide considerable information on the variation in fiscal cyclicality across countries, and we use this exogenous variation to identify the causal effect of cyclicality on output volatility and economic growth.
We find that cyclical fiscal (expenditure) policy has a destabilizing effect on the economy, no matter whether it is pro-or countercyclical. In fact, it amplifies output volatility much the same way as discretionary fiscal policy. This adds to the widespread scepticism against the usefulness of fiscal policy as a fine-tuning instrument. We also find that output volatility, induced by variations in cyclical or fiscal policy, negatively affects economic growth. Taken together this has an important policy implication: Economic growth could be enhanced by introducing fiscal rules, designed to restrict both the use of discretionary fiscal policy (Fatas and Mihov, 2003) as well as the use of cyclical fiscal policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II constructs measures of fiscal cyclicality and the aggressiveness of discretionary fiscal policy for a large cross-section of 88 countries. Section III motivates the identification strategy and provides evidence on the relation between cyclical (and discretionary) fiscal policy and output volatility. Section IV considers the effect of cyclicality on economic growth. Section V summarizes the results and concludes.
II. Constructing Measures of Cyclical and Discretionary Fiscal Policy
We use government consumption as indicator of fiscal policy. This choice is dictated by data availability, since there are no internationally comparable data for other measures of fiscal policy for our large cross-section of countries. On the one hand, this limits the generality of our results. On the other hand, an advantage is that government expenditures -compared with revenues -are less responsive to the cycle through stabilizers "built-in" the fiscal system and can be changed with relative ease. As a consequence, expenditures are more indicative of a government"s intentional cyclical policy than revenues, whose cyclical behaviour is driven by automatic stabilizers to a much larger extent. Moreover, previous studies suggest that the cyclicality of government consumption reflects the cyclicality of overall government expenditures reasonably well. In Lane (2003) , for example, who studies the determinants of cyclical fiscal policy using a sample of 22 OECD countries, the correlation between the cyclicality of government consumption and that of total government expenditures is 0.71. We follow the standard approach in the literature and estimate cyclicality parameters () by regressing growth of real government consumption (G) on the growth of real GDP (Y), correcting for serial correlation in the error term:
Equation (1) is estimated separately for each of the i = 1, …, 88 countries, which is the largest set of countries for which the key variables required in the present study are available. The time dimension t ranges from 1960 to 2004; for some countries, a slightly shorter time span had to be used (see Appendix A1).
Equation (1) is considered as reduced form equation for government consumption and estimated by ordinary least squares. As a result we obtain a decomposition of the growth of government consumption into a cyclical and a discretionary component. The time series of country i"s cyclical fiscal policy is given by
; and the estimate of the (structural) residual of equation (1), i.e., t i,  , is interpreted as series of discretionary fiscal policy shocks.
By least squares algebra these two series are orthogonal.
In the following, we will estimate the effects of cyclical fiscal policy on volatility and growth from a cross-section regression, where we will use the estimates of the parameter  i as country-specific indicators of the average cyclicality of fiscal policy. A positive (negative) value of  i is associated with procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal behaviour. Our results indicate substantial cross-country variation in the cyclicality parameters, whose estimates range from -0.835 to 2.698. Most of the countries show procyclical fiscal expenditure policy; only 11 of the 88 coefficients are negative (see Appendix A1). In line with Fatas and Mihov (2003) , we us as a measure of discretionary fiscal policy (DISCR) the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (1) Our basic empirical framework builds on Fatas and Mihov (2003) ; as a novel feature the cyclicality of fiscal policy is included as explanatory variable for output volatility:
The dependent variable is output volatility ( y ), defined as standard deviation of the growth rate of (real) output per capita; CYC is our measure of the cyclicality of fiscal policy, which we construct from the estimates of equation (1) as will be outlined more in detail below; x i is a vector of control variables, and u is a stochastic error term. The cross-section dimension (i) comprises 88 countries, the largest sample for which the required data are available. Unless mentioned otherwise, all data are averages over the period 1960 to 2004 (see Appendix A1).
As it is standard in skedastic regressions, we choose a logarithmic specification to avoid negative predicted values; it is then natural to use the cyclicality measure in log form as well, such that the parameter of our main interest ( 1 ) measures the relative change of output volatility with respect to relative changes in cyclicality. 2 We define cyclicality (CYC) as absolute value of  to allow for negative values of the cyclicality coefficients i  in the logarithmic specification (2a). Obviously, the variable CYC =  then measures only the cyclical responsiveness of fiscal policy, but not whether it is proor countercyclical. This could be addressed by properly signing ln CYC for the respective observations. But this would assume that -if procyclical policy amplifies business cyclescountercyclical policy smoothes business cycles. This is an assumption we wish to test rather than impose right from the beginning, given the widespread scepticism against the effectiveness of fiscal policy as fine-tuning instrument. Countercyclical fiscal policy might actually turn out destabilizing due to lags in (recognition, implementation, and) materialization, a point prominently made by Friedman (1953) .
Consequently, we do not impose any assumption about the relation between the effects of pro-and countercyclical policy. Instead, we define CYC i as absolute value of 
where D counter is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for "countercyclical observations", i.e., While the logarithmic specification yields a slightly better fit, it is not crucial for the results. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   6 difference between the effect of countercyclical fiscal policy and the effect of procyclical fiscal policy on output volatility ( 1 ).
We start from a simple regression of output volatility on cyclicality (CYC) and then add three standard controls: Government size (GSIZE), openness (OPEN), measured as imports plus exports as a share of GDP, and real GDP per capita (GDPPC), i.e.,
Regarding government size, it has been argued that more volatile economies may have an incentive to set up larger governments as a means to reduce macroeconomic volatility (Rodrik, 1998) . As a consequence, GSIZE might be endogenous in equation (2). In line with Fatas and Mihov (2003) we use the standard approach and instrument GSIZE by the (log of) population (POP), the urbanization rate (URBAN), and the dependency ratio (DEP).
In a final step, we will include the aggressiveness of discretionary fiscal policy as defined in section II (DISCR), yielding our most comprehensive model:
Before turning to the estimation of models (2) and (3), two issues warrant discussion. First, our variable of main interest, the cyclicality of fiscal policy (CYC), is endogenous with respect to output volatility as a result of reverse causality. Talvi and Vegh (2005) show in a political economy model that high output volatility tends to generate procyclical fiscal behaviour.
3 This would introduce an upward bias in the estimated effect of cyclicality on output volatility. In addition, the cyclicality measure (CYC) is an estimate of its true value and might thus be subject to classical measurement error, causing an attenuation bias. Another issue, related to the fact that our country-specific cyclicality measures ( i ) are generated by model (1), is that the observations on our variable CYC i are estimated with different precision. This is addressed by using a weighted (two stages) least squares procedure, using the inverse of the variance of i  as weights. 4 This implies that observations, for which the variable CYC is measured more precisely, are assigned a higher weight in the regression. As we show below the weighting improves the fit but it is not crucial for the results.
2.
Identification They also provide evidence from a large cross-section of countries that the degree of procyclicality in government consumption is positively correlated with output volatility. Lane (2003) obtains a similar results for a sample of 22 OECD countries. 4 The choice of the weight is not affected by the logarithmic transformation. By the delta method, In order to identify the causal effect of cyclicality on output volatility, we use countries" political and institutional characteristics as instruments. We hypothesize that countries" political and institutional characteristics are not only relevant determinants of discretionary fiscal policy (as shown by Fatas and Mihov (2003) ) but also of cyclical fiscal policy. In particular, we consider four institutional variables: the average number of elections (NELEC), an index of political constraints (POLCON) by Henisz (2000) , a dummy for majoritarian systems (MAJ), and a dummy for presidential regimes (PRES).
To motivate the choice of instruments, notice that the variable CYC, defined as absolute value of cyclicality (CYC =  ), in the first place measures the aggressiveness (but not the direction) of cyclical fiscal policy. As a consequence, part of the discussion by Fatas and Mihov (2003) motivating the use of the institutional variables (NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, PRES) as instruments for the aggressiveness of discretionary policy directly carries over to our measure of cyclical fiscal policy (CYC).
The extent of political constraints (POLCON) is the instrument with the strongest theoretical motivation. According to the "voracity hypothesis" (Tornell and Lane, 1998), power diffusion among more agents induces procyclicality, since fiscal competition by multiple power groups for fiscal revenues increases (decreases) in booms (recessions). On the other hand, governments less constrained in implementing their policy can respond more flexibly to the business cycle and will thus be better able to translate their "cyclicality preferences" into actual policy.
Regarding electoral characteristics, the frequency and timing of elections (NELEC) and the induced electoral cycles will not be systematically related to the business cycle. As a consequence, the observed pattern of fiscal policy will show a smaller association with the business cycle, the larger the number of elections, i.e., the more the responsiveness of fiscal policy to the business cycle is diluted by fiscal measures related to the electoral cycle. A similar point can be made for MAJ in light of the argument by Persson and Tabellini (2001) that majoritarian systems will have more pronounced electoral cycles. Finally, it could be the case that presidential regimes will not only be associated with a more aggressive use of discretionary fiscal policy as argued by Fatas and Mihov (2003) , but also with a more active conduct of cyclical fiscal policy.
While our choice of the institutional variables NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, and PRES is well motivated, the ultimate question is whether they are also relevant in our empirical model. Table 1 reports the results of a regression of the log of CYC on the four institutional variables separately (columns (1a) to (1d)) and simultaneously (column (2a)). The number of elections (NELEC) and political constraints (POLCON) turn out to have the strongest effect; they are significant both in a simple regression (columns (1a) and (1b)) of is negative as expected. The variable POLCON also enters with a negative sign; this does not necessarily reject the voracity hypothesis but suggests that -among the various ways through which political constraints affect the cyclicality of fiscal (expenditure) policy -the voracity effect does not appear to be the most dominant force. 5 The variables MAJ and PRES are insignificant or only weakly significantly and would thus weaken the quality of our set of instruments (compare the F-statistic in columns (2a) and (2b)). Hence, we will use only NELEC and POLCON as instruments for CYC in the two stages least squares regressions below.
< Table 1 >
Notice that column (2b) corresponds to the first stage regression for equation (2a) only in the most parsimonious specification without additional explanatory variables for output volatility. The first stage regression for the most comprehensive model including all controls -GSIZE (instrumented by POP, URBAN, and DEP), OPEN, and GDPPC -is given in column (3). An important result is that the variables NELEC and POLCON remain significant, both individually and jointly.
Column (4) shows the corresponding first stage regression for discretionary fiscal policy (DISCR). Results are in line with Fatas and Mihov (2003) . Notice that -in contrast to the first stage regression for CYC -the two variables MAJ and PRES turn out significant at the five and one percent level. At least from an empirical perspective, this suggest that the variation in the variables MAJ and PRES may be helpful to identify the separate effect of discretionary policy in model (3), where both CYC and DISCR are included.
Overall, the results reveal interesting links between institutions and cyclicality. Exploring these links more in detail is beyond the scope of this paper. For the purpose of the present study, the most relevant message from the results in Table 1 is that the two variables NELEC and POLCON are relevant instruments for cyclicality (CYC); this is not the case for the variables MAJ and PRES, which are, however, strongly associated with the aggressiveness of discretionary fiscal policy (DISCR).
Estimation Results
We start from the most parsimonious specification of model (2), which includes only cyclicality (CYC) as explanatory variable.
6 Columns (1a) and (1b) show the weighted least 5 Lane (2003) also finds little support for the voracity hypothesis in his study of the cyclicality of expenditures in a sample of 22 OECD countries; in particular, the effect of political constraints on cyclicality is often insignificant or shows the wrong sign.
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The weighting accounts for the fact that CYC is a generated regressor, not for the presence of heteroskedasticity in the error term in models (2) or (3) (which is also confirmed by standard tests). Hence, we use robust standard errors for inference throughout. (2a), which allows the effects of pro-and countercyclical fiscal policy to differ by including an interaction between CYC and a dummy for countercyclical policy (D counter ). The estimated elasticity of output volatility with respect to procyclical fiscal policy is 0.184; the effect of countercyclical policy appears to be even larger (0.278), but the difference is insignificant with a p-value of 0.300. This conclusion holds up when the model is estimated by weighted two stages least squares (WTSLS), using the average number of elections (NELEC) and the index of political constraints (POLCON) as instruments for CYC (column (1b)). In that case the elasticities with respect to pro-and countercyclical fiscal policy are 0.595 and 0.501 respectively, but again the difference is insignificant (p-value: 0.618).
< Table 2 > In light of this result we proceed with a restricted model, imposing parameter equality for pro-and countercyclical fiscal policy. Columns (2a) and (2b) show the WLS and WTSLS estimates of the simple regression of volatility on cyclicality. For comparison, columns (3a) and (3b) show the results of the unweighted LS and TSLS estimates. Notice first, that endogeneity of CYC is indeed pronounced: The difference between the (W)LS and (W)TSLS coefficients is sizeable. More formally, a Hausman test rejects that CYC is exogenous at the one percent level in all specifications. It is interesting to note that both the weighted and unweighted LS estimates of the effect of CYC on volatility show a strong attenuation bias towards zero. This suggests that measurement error is the dominant source of endogeneity rather than reverse causality (causing an upward bias). This view is also supported by a comparison of the weighted and unweighted estimates. In the weighted regressions, less precise estimates are assigned a lower weight, rendering the role of measurement error less relevant. As a consequence, the attenuation bias is less pronounced in the WLS regression, yielding coefficients that are closer to the WTSLS estimates.
While we postpone a more comprehensive sensitivity analysis to below, we emphasize that the weighting is not crucial for the results: A comparison of columns (2b) and (3b) shows that the weighted and unweighted TSLS estimates are virtually identical, pointing to an elasticity of output volatility with respect to cyclicality of around 0.6. The choice of the logarithmic form of CYC is not essential for the qualitative conclusions as well: The corresponding results for the specification in levels (columns (4a) and (4b)) are in line with the logarithmic specification (columns (1b) and (2b)).
A final observation is that the tests for overidentifying restrictions reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments in some specifications. This is not too surprising, given that several important variables have been omitted from the regression so far. Results for a more comprehensive model, including GSIZE, OPEN and GDPPC as controls are given in Table 3 . As already discussed above, government size is likely to be endogenous with respect to volatility, which is addressed by using population (POP), the urbanization rate (URBAN), and the dependency ratio (DEP) as instruments for GSIZE.
< Table 3 >
Columns (1a) and (1b) show the unweighted LS and TSLS estimates, whereas column (1c) gives the results of the WTSLS estimation. As expected the estimated elasticity of volatility with respect to cyclicality becomes smaller in magnitude when the control variables are added (around 0.3) but remains significant. Exogeneity of CYC is still clearly rejected in all models; we thus focus on the (W)TSLS results. The OID tests are insignificant in most specifications, suggesting that the institutional variables NELEC and POLCON (as well as POP, DEP, URBAN) are valid instruments. To reinforce the finding of our parsimonious specification, we repeat the test for parameter equality between pro-and countercyclical policy (see columns (2a) and (2b)). The conclusion is the same as before: There is no evidence for a stabilizing effect of countercyclical fiscal policy. In contrast, it adds to output volatility, in a way not significantly different from that of procyclical fiscal policy.
Of course, the results regarding the role of countercyclical policy should be interpreted with care. The number of countries which pursued countercyclical fiscal policy on average is rather small (11 out of the 88). While this might be too little variation to yield a significant difference in the estimated effect, it does not explain that the effect of countercyclical policy on volatility is always positive, a finding that is extremely robust. We also emphasize that our results should be interpreted as averages over countries and time. One cannot rule out that a highly effective government, which is aware of the relevant lag structures and able to respond very quickly, might be successful in its fiscal efforts to smooth business cycles. What our evidence suggest, however, is that such a constellation is rather the exception than the rule.
Finally, we consider the results for model (3), which includes both cyclicality (CYC) and discretionary fiscal policy (DISCR). It is a subtle question, whether discretionary fiscal policy should be controlled for. On the one hand, discretionary fiscal policy is certainly a relevant determinant of output volatility (Fatas and Mihov (2003) , Badinger (2008) ). Moreover, while the time series of discretionary and cyclical fiscal policy measures for a single country are orthogonal, this does not carry over the cross-country variation in cyclical and discretionary policy (averaged over time): Countries that are more responsive to the cycle might also more actively engage in discretionary fiscal policy.
Under these two assumptions -DISCR matters for volatility and is related to CYC -the estimated effect of CYC in model (2) will be upward biased due to the omission of DISCR. In that case, however, we would also expect the OID test to reject instrument validity, since the instruments used for CYC (i.e., POLCON, NELEC) are also related to discretionary policy (see section III, subsection 2). But this is not the case in any of the specifications, suggesting that these two elements of fiscal policy could be (close to) orthogonal in the cross-section. One could still argue that the OID test has small power and CYC and DISCR should be regarded as related for theoretical reasons. Even in that case the question remains, whether discretionary policy should be controlled for: A main reason for a possible association between DISCR and CYC is that an active conduct of cyclical fiscal policy might partly result in (unintentional) discretionary policy (unrelated to the cycle) as a result of lags in implementation and materialization (again, on average over countries and time). Since these unintentional consequences of cyclical fiscal policy can hardly be ruled out by policy makers in practice, it might be reasonable to let the parameter of cyclicality in model (2) also capture its indirect effects on volatility through is relation to discretionary fiscal policy.
Notwithstanding these arguments that might favour model (2) over model (3), we now turn to the results when DISCR is included (see column (3a)). As expected the coefficient of CYC becomes smaller, pointing to an elasticity of volatility with respect to cyclicality of around 0.163, but it remains significant at the 10 percent level. The elasticity with respect to discretionary fiscal policy is 0.454 but insignificant with a p-value of 0.103. This is not too surprising; since both variables are instrumented using mainly the same set of institutional variables (only MAJ and PRES are added as additional instruments for DISCR), the predicted values for CYC and DISCR from the first stage regressions will be strongly correlated, causing a multicollinearity problem in the second stage regression. This is aggravated by the presence of a third endogenous variable (GSIZE).
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To address this weak instruments problem, we reestimate the model by limited information maximum likelihood (LIML), which is superior to TSLS estimation in the presence of weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2004) . In that case CYC and DISCR turn both out significant with elasticities of 0.182 and 0.417 respectively (see column (3b)). Another route would be to use a compound measure of discretionary and cyclical fiscal policy (ln CYC+ln DISCR), which could be justified in light of the fact that the hypothesis of parameter equality cannot be rejected (F-statistic: 0.704, p-value: 0.403) . In the restricted model, the compound measure of fiscal policy turns out highly significant with a coefficient of 0.238 (column (4)). The economic interpretation of this restricted model with equal parameters for cyclical and discretionary fiscal policy carries our finding regarding the irrelevance of the direction of cyclicality one step further: Not only has countercyclical policy the same effect on volatility as procyclical fiscal policy. It also implies that cyclical fiscal policy (CYC) has the same amplifying effect on output volatility as "random" discretionary fiscal policy shocks, suggesting that the effects of intentional cyclical policy measures -due 7 If government size is treated exogenous and population is included as instrument, CYC and DISCR turn out significant at the five and one percent level respectively. However, since there are strong theoretical arguments to regard government size as endogenous, and since the theoretical motivation for using country size (population) as instrument for CYC and DISCR is weak (despite the fact that is highly significant in the first stage regression), we pursue the more conservative approach here and treat GSIZE as endogenous. 
IV. Fiscal Cyclicality, Volatility, and Economic Growth
From a theoretical perspective, the relation between output volatility and economic growth is ambiguous (see Imbs, 2007) . Empirically, Ramey and Ramey (1995) found a negative effect of output volatility on economic growth, and -though there is no consensus so far -the evidence that has emerged since then tends to support this finding. While a number of studies have considered the effect of output volatility on growth, there is hardly evidence on the relation between the cyclicality of fiscal policy and growth. One noteable exception is Aghion and Marinescu (2007) , who find a positive effect of countercyclicality measures in a growth regression, using an (unbalanced) panel of annual data for 19 OECD countries from 1960 to 2007. Moreover, no previous study has considered the relations between cyclicality, volatility and growth in a joint empirical framework.
We first consider the effects of cyclicality on growth directly, running a cross-section regression of average growth of real GDP per worker over ( GDPPW ln  ) on the cyclicality of fiscal policy (CYC), again testing for differences in the effect of pro-and countercyclical policy:
The following standard controls (w i ) are included in our cross-country growth regression: the (log of the) initial level of real GDP per worker (GDPPW in ), the average level of human capital in terms of educational attainment, i.e., the fraction of males above 25 with primary schooling (HC prim ) and secondary schooling (HC sec ). Model (4) refers to the time period from 1960 to 2004 again; the cross-section dimension comprises 80 rather than 88 countries due to missing human capital data.
As in section III, the endogeneity of CYC is addressed by using the institutional variables NELEC and POLCON as instruments; and the fact that CYC is calculated from fitted values of model (1) is accounted for by a weighted least squares approach, using the inverse of the variance of CYC as weight.
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This argument was already made by Friedman in his informal essay on fiscal policy: "In fiscal as in monetary policy, all political considerations aside, we simply do not know enough to be able to use deliberate changes in taxation and or expenditures as a sensitive stabilization mechanism. In the process of trying to do so, we almost surely make matters worse… by introducing a largely random disturbance that is simply added to other disturbances." (Friedman, 1962, p. 78) . Table 4 report the unweighted LS and TSLS estimates, allowing the effect of pro-and countercyclicality to differ. Columns (2a) and (2b) report the respective weighted estimates. In all specifications we find a significantly negative effect of cyclicality on economic growth. As in section II, only the magnitude of cyclicality seems to matter: We find a negative effect of both pro-and countercyclicality on economic growth, and while the coefficient of countercyclical fiscal policy is smaller in magnitude, the difference in the coefficients is not significantly different from zero. This holds true for both the unweighted and the weighted estimates. According to the Hausman test there is no strong evidence for endogeneity of CYC, though the (W)LS estimates of the parameter of CYC are always smaller in magnitude than the (W)TSLS estimates.
The results in Table 4 suggest a negative relation between the cyclicality of fiscal policy and economic growth. In the corresponding model (4), which omits output volatility (and further controls), the parameter of CYC ( 1 ) captures all effects of cyclicality on economic growth, both through its relation with output volatility (direct and indirect through DISCR), through its relation with other variables affecting growth, as well as "direct" effects of cyclicality on economic growth (if any). From an economic policy perspective, this might in fact be the most relevant question.
Nevertheless, we would like to provide a more detailed picture of the relation between cyclicality and growth. In particular, we also wish to answer the question whether CYC affects growth only through output volatility or also directly. 9 The empirical framework employed to address this question is sketched by Figure 1 , which illustrates the interrelationships between the key variables in our empirical models. Potential endogeneity is indicated by reversed arrows (though the source of endogeneity is not necessarily simultaneity); relations between variables of the same equation (such as CYC and DISCR) are omitted for simplicity here.
< Figure 1 >
To test for a direct effect of cyclicality on growth, we first consider a model relating growth to output volatility (and controls). We then add cyclicality as additional regressor (again considering potentially different effects of pro-and countercyclical policy):
Such a direct link could be motivated through the model by Aghion et al. (2005) . They argue that credit constrained firms have a borrowing capacity that depends on current earnings, which are reduced in recessions. Hence, countercyclicality may foster productivity growth by reducing the magnitude of the output loss induced by market failures (as credit market imperfections) in a recession, and one could argue that such an effect should also hold for a given output volatility. Column (1a) in Table 5 reports the least squares estimates of equation (5), column (1b) the TSLS estimates using the full set of institutional variables (NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, PRES) as instruments for volatility. 10 Results of the TSLS estimates point to a negative effect of volatility on growth, consistent with our finding that cyclicality increases volatility (models (2) and (3)) and reduces growth (model (4)). The coefficient of output volatility (-2.968) suggests that an increase in volatility by one percent reduces average growth by some 0.3 percentage points. This is close to Fatas and Mihov (2003) , who obtain a coefficient of -3.371 in a similar regression. We emphasize that results are very similar when MAJ and PRES are excluded from the set of instruments, or when CYC or DISCR are used as instruments directly. This is supportive of the finding in section III that the transmission mechanisms from political institutions to output volatility through cyclical and discretionary fiscal policy are very similar.
< Table 5 > Altough the OID tests, reported at the bottom of Table 5 , suggest that there is nothing wrong with our instruments, we use, as a robustness check, an alternative instrument for output volatility (Z  ), which is entirely unrelated to the respective country"s characteristics. In particular, we use for each country i, the trade share weighted output volatility of all other countries j ( i) in the sample. To ensure exogeneity two modifications are made: actual trade shares are replaced by predicted values from a bilateral gravity model including geographical variables only; actual output volatility is replaced by predicted values from a regression of output volatility on (a constant and) the four institutional variables (NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, PRES) (see Badinger (2010) ). The variable Z  also turns out to be a relevant instrument for output volatility besides the four institutional variables (NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, PRES). In the first stage regression for model (5), including all four institutional variables, Z  is significant at the one percent level. In fact, Z  turns out to be the strongest instrument for output volatility besides political constraints (POLCON). This is an important result, since it implies that Z  adds variation to identify the effect of output volatility in the growth regression (5) with CYC included as regressor, in addition to the identifying variation, which comes from the effects of institutions on volatility through on DISCR (which might be too closely associated with the effects of CYC on volatility) (see Figure 1) .
Column (1c) shows the TSLS estimates of model (4), using only Z  as instrument; the estimated effect of volatility is even larger in magnitude, though the estimates are less precise. Nevertheless, output volatility remains significant with a p-value of 0.087. The fit of the model improves, when the four institutional variables are included as additional instruments (see column (1d)). Overall, the estimates of model (5) in columns (1b) to (1d), which differ
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Results for specifications without CYC are unweighted estimates. We next consider the robustness of the results with respect to controlling for institutional quality, which we measure using the government antidiversion policy (GADP) index by Hall and Jones (1999) . Since institutional quality might be endogenous as a result of reverse causality, we follow Hall and Jones (1999) and use proxies for Western influence as instruments for GADP: distance from equator, the fraction of a country"s population speaking English as mother tongue, and the fraction of a country"s population speaking one of the five European languages (English, French, German, Portuguese, Spanish) as mother tongue. Results in column (2) show that output volatility remains significant and negatively related to economic growth, even if institutional quality in terms of GADP is controlled for.
We now test for a direct effect of cyclicality on growth. This means, that the variable CYC is included in the main equation (and instrumented by itself), whereas output volatility is instrumented by the institutional variables (NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, PRES) and exogenous volatility spillover (Z  ). Columns (3a), (3b), and (3c) show the LS, TSLS, and WTSLS
estimates of equation (5) including institutional quality as control. 11 The estimates show no evidence for a direct effect. This holds up for the unweighted and least squares regressions or when we allow the effect of pro-and countercyclical policy to differ (see column (4)). We also explored the subsample stability with respect to the cross-country dimension (rich countries, excluding countries with large volatility or cyclicality coefficients) and the time dimension, considering the more recent time span 1980 to 2004. In none of the specifications, we could identify a direct effect of cyclicality besides output volatility, irrespective of whether we allow the effect of countercyclical policy to differ from that of procyclical policy or not.
Overall, the findings in sections III and section IV provide a consistent picture. Cyclical as well as discretionary fiscal policy amplify output volatility (Tables 2 to 4) , which is in turn negatively related to economic growth (Table 5 ). This also shows up in direct estimates of growth on cyclicality (Table 4 ). The effects found for rich countries are of the same order of 11 Notice that, since CYC is included in the main model, the independent variation to identify the effect of volatility on growth comes from the instrument Z  as well as from the effect of institutions on volatility through discretionary fiscal policy (see Figure 2) . The latter is also apparent from the fact, that in a regression with output volatility as dependent variable, the political variables (MAJ, PRES, NELEC, POLCON) are jointly significant determinants of output volatility when CYC is controlled for, but they become insignificant if DISCR is added to the regressions as well. This suggests an alternative approach, using DISCR as instrument for  y directly (instead of the instead of the institutional variables); results turned out almost identical and are not shown here for brevity. 
V. Conclusions
Previous studies found that discretionary fiscal policy, defined as policy unrelated to the business cycle, lowers output growth by increasing output volatility. Using a large crosssection of 88 countries over the period 1960 to 2004, the present paper provides comprehensive empirical evidence that this is also true for cyclical fiscal policy.
We estimate simple average measures of cyclicality of government consumption over the period 1960 to 2004 for each of the 88 countries of our sample. We find that cyclical fiscal policy constitutes a non-negligible share of overall fiscal policy, accounting for roughly one fifth in the total variation of government consumption in our sample. We then demonstrate that institutional variables (such as political constraints and the average number of elections) contain considerable information about the cross-country variation of fiscal cyclicality, similar as for discretionary fiscal policy (Fatas and Mihov, 2003) .
Using institutional variables as instruments, we identify a destabilizing effect of cyclical fiscal policy on economic activity, irrespective of whether fiscal policy is pro-or countercyclical. This not only confirms the scepticisms against the usefulness of countercyclical fiscal policy as fine tuning instrument to smooth business cycles. It also implies that countercyclical policy has the same amplifying effect on volatility as procyclical fiscal policy; in fact, we find some support for the hypothesis that cyclical fiscal policy affects volatility much in the same way as pure fiscal shocks. According to this result, the way towards stabilization does not lead over more active countercyclical fiscal policy, but less cyclical fiscal policy at all.
The gains from this (passive) stabilization policy could be substantial in light of our finding that aggressive use of cyclical (as well as discretionary fiscal) policy has a negative effect on economic growth. This result is obtained both in a direct regression of growth on cyclicality and in a two stages least squares regression of growth on volatility, using the fiscal policy-related institutional variables as instrumental variables in the first stage regression.
Overall, our results have an important policy implication: Economic growth could be enhanced by introducing fiscal rules, designed to limit the use of discretionary fiscal policy on the one hand (as already argued by Fatas and Mihov, 2003) but also the use cyclical fiscal expenditure policy on the other hand. Notwithstanding the robustness of our results with respect to subsample stability over the cross-country and time dimension, It should be added, however, that our cross-section estimates should be interpreted as averages over countries and time, not as economic laws that apply to every government at any time. Moreover, the use of government consumption as measure of fiscal policy-a choice required to obtain a relatively F o r P e e r R e v i e w 17 large sample of countries -limits the generality of the results. As a consequence, it would be interesting to investigate the effect of fiscal policy on volatility and growth for smaller groups of countries with more comprehensive, more detailed and higher frequency data on fiscal policy. Another question that remains to be addressed in future research is how existing fiscal rules affect the cyclical responsiveness of governments. Additional evidence on these issues would be informative about the channels, through which fiscal policy affects economic growth, and the optimal design of fiscal rules. 
A1. Sample Description
The largest set of countries for which the required key variables are available comprises 88 countries. The list of countries is reported in Table A1 , along with our estimates of the cyclicality parameter  and the aggressiveness of discretionary fiscal policy (DISCR) from equation (1). 1960 -2004 1980 -2004 1960 -2004 1980 -2004 1960 -2004 1980 -2004 Argentina 1960 -2004 1960 -2004 1980 -2004 1960 -2004 1980 -2004 1960 -2004 1980 -2004 Israel 1960 -2004 Table A2 shows that the logarithmic transformation of CYC is not crucial for the results (see columns (1a) and (1b)). However, the fit is worse than for the specification in log form. We next consider subsample stability of the results, excluding countries with "large" output volatility or "large" cyclicality from the sample. Columns (2a) and (2b) give the results for models (2) and (3), excluding countries whose output volatility exceeds the sample average by more than one standard deviation. The same exercise is repeated in columns (3a) and (3b), excluding countries whose cyclicality coefficients exceed the sample average by more than one standard deviation. Overall, the results for the full sample hold up, confirming that our results are not driven by a few outlying observations. < Table A2> In columns (4a) and (4b) we focus on a subsample of 28 "rich" countries, constituting the upper third of the income distribution of our sample in terms of GDP per capita. In both models (2) and (3) the variable CYC becomes insignificant with p-values of 0.245 and 0.193, respectively. However, if the level of development (GDPPC) is excluded, which appears to be justifiable for a group of countries with a similar level of development (in particular in model (3) where GDPPC is insignificant), CYC becomes significant again in models (2) and (3) 766 (0.935) . This also favours the interpretation that (de facto) time invariant institutional features of countries have a strong impact on the cross-country variation in fiscal policy. A slight difference to the estimation results for period 1960 to 2004 is that the effect of countercyclicality is significantly different from that of procyclical policy in the logarithmic specification (see column (5a)), though its effect on output volatility is still clearly positive. One might argue that countercyclical policy has become more effective (and thus overall less destabilizing). But this appears to be overstressing results a bit, given that there is no significant difference between the effects of pro-and countercyclical policy if the level rather than the log of CYC is used; column (5b) shows the (restricted) model using the level of CYC.
The estimates of model (3) for the period 1980 to 2004 (columns (6a) and (6b)), where DISCR is included along with CYC, are in line with the results for the full period 1960 to 2000, in particular when the model is estimated using LIML (column (6b)). As before the hypothesis of parameter equality of CYC and DISCR cannot be rejected. Finally, the subsample stability with respect to the cross-country dimension for the period 1980 to 2004 is qualitatively very similar to that for the full period. Notes: A constant is included in all models. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively; standard errors in parenthesis. 
